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Abstract:     Given their growth records, large markets, and reformed economic systems, 
both China and India appear to be equally likely candidates for foreign direct investment 
(FDI).  Yet, China has received substantially more FDI.  The literature comparing FDI in 
these two countries is small, and does not provide conclusive evidence to explain this 
puzzle. Applying the Porterian framework of the competitiveness of nations to compare 
China and India, we garner evidence that differences in demand, factor conditions and 
firm strategy, structure and rivalry are not sufficient to explain the differential in the two 
countries’ FDI flows.  Differences in related and supporting industries, as well as Porter’s 
other two factors—government and chance factors—are more compelling.  We identify 
China’s early entry into East Asian production networks in the 1980s as a key factor 
pushing China ahead of India in terms of FDI. We argue that this coincidental mix of 
timing and geography (Porter’s ‘chance’ factor), pushed forward in China by establishing 
special economic zones, gave China a sustainable competitive advantage for the 
following two decades. What is implied from these findings is that China’s FDI sources 
have been much larger and heavily slanted towards East Asia and manufacturing, while 
India, having missed this particular historical phase, needed to find an alternate route to 





Competitiveness in India and China: The FDI puzzle 
 
Introduction 
 Impressive projections of growth in India and China are increasingly optimistic 
and have caught the attention of analysts and policy makers around the world.  By 
purchasing power measures, in 2010 India was ranked as the fourth largest economy in 
the world in terms of the value of goods and services produced annually, and China was 
second.  In the five years from 2005 to 2009, India’s average GDP growth rate has been 
8.5 percent and China’s has been 11.4 percent (World Databank). The importance of 
trade and foreign investment in China has grown substantially, which has been a hallmark 
of the success of China’s opening policies that began almost three decades ago.   India 
began to encourage trade and foreign investment a decade later than China, but has also 
successfully changed India’s trade dynamics with the global economy.  Based on the 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index for 2010-11, China ranked 27th 
and India was 51st.   In the 2001-02 report, China was 39th and India was 57th , showing 
that competitiveness has improved substantially in both countries relative to many others 
(World Economic Forum, 2009).    
 In contrast, in decades past both India and China pursued import substitution 
industrialization policies aimed at isolation from the global economy.  Both countries 
combined restrictive trade policies with various degrees of economic planning and 
regulation, all of which focused on building productive capacity at the expense of 
consumer preferences.  Imports and production of non-essential consumer goods were 
highly restricted.  The fact that these economies have rejoined the market-oriented, 
international system represents revolutionary shifts in policy, and consumers have been 
one of the major beneficiaries.    
 Given the growth paths and the size of these two economies, both countries would 
seem to be magnets for multinational corporations.  However, China’s foreign 
investment, and especially foreign direct investment (FDI), has been multiple times more 
than India's.  Between 1995 and 2009, China received approximately $730 billion more 
than India.  There has been much debate about the measures used to assess the FDI 
potential of the two countries, but even when adjustments are made for differences in 
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data categories, China’s FDI is surprisingly higher than India’s (Khanna 2007, pp.157-58; 
Swamy 2006).   In this paper we focus on what factors or strategies caused China to 
attract more FDI as compared to India.   Using Porter’s framework, we explore each 
country’s circumstances that support or impede the pursuit of strategic competitiveness 
(Porter, 1998a).  We argue that Porter’s factors of “chance” and “government” played 
crucial roles in attracting a higher level of FDI to China and also defined the type of FDI 
in one nation versus the other.   We believe that the story of China’s substantial lead in 
FDI lies in its fortuitous location intertwined with the timing of its reforms that resulted 
in its increasingly central role in the East Asian region. 
  
China-India FDI Literature 
 The substantial difference in the level of FDI receipts in these two nations is a 
puzzle.  There are numerous publications comparing economic growth and transition in 
China and India on various dimensions, but there are very few studies that focus on FDI 
per se.1   Most studies focus on explanations for differences in growth and other 
performance variables, with FDI sometimes included as one factor.   
 One exception is a paper by Wei (2005) that tries to explain the FDI differential 
directly.  Using OECD data across countries and over time on home country outward 
investment to China and India, Wei tested for possible factors that are significant in 
explaining FDI flows.  Based on 1987 to 2000 FDI flows for 15 countries, Wei found that 
both countries benefit from their large domestic markets (measured as the ratio of real 
home country GDP to real host country’s GDP), but that China’s relatively larger market 
overwhelms some of India’s other advantages.  Interestingly, India benefits from 
relatively lower labor costs, as well as lower country risk, while China benefits from 
more advanced trade ties with the OECD countries.    This approach of using outward 
FDI data from OECD provides adequate data for statistical analysis and also minimizes 
data discrepancy issues since the FDI definitions are the same and are reported by the 
home countries.  However, as Wei’s study only covers OECD countries, which do not 
make up the majority of FDI inflow to either India or China, the author acknowledges 
that the results are only a part of the story.  
 A second paper by Sinha, Kent and Shomali (2007) used data from three sub-
regions in China for 1978-2005, and separately from six states in India for 1992-2005, to 
estimate in each case how the business climates affected FDI inflows.  In the case of 
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India, their model suggests a positive correlation between FDI inflow and human capital, 
market size and rate of growth.  In their China estimates, structural changes, strategic 
infrastructure and strategic policy are positively correlated with FDI inflows, along with 
market size and rate of growth.  As these data, variables and results are described only 
briefly in the paper, it is difficult to compare this work with Wei’s study or to provide 
more details.  Not surprisingly, the authors conclude that India needs structural change, 
better infrastructure and more enlightened policy to attract more FDI.   
 Using an alternative approach, Henley (2004) focuses on political differences.  
Henley argues that some interest groups within India have impeded liberalization.  
Specifically he suggests that they pressure various levels of government for spending 
resulting in public deficits that prevent government funding for infrastructure and other 
pro-development projects, thus discouraging FDI.    In contrast, local governments in 
China responded to incentives to promote FDI, including direct mandates to show that 
they had attracted FDI, as well as opportunities to reap the tax revenues that would be 
generated by these companies.  Henley argues that local governments in India have much 
less motivation to want FDI in their jurisdictions.   While political differences no doubt 
matter in some aspects—especially the slowness of opening the economy to global 
business in the 1980s—this explanation seems inadequate to us.  There are certainly 
states in India that have attracted FDI, just as in China certain provinces and cities have 
benefitted relatively more from foreign investment.  In addition, some analysts argue that 
India’s democracy is a distinct political advantage over China’s one-party system, which 
would make politics a relative strength for India.  Fan and Li (2009) note that while the 
Indian growth process is chaotic, India’s soft infrastructure, which includes a independent 
press, an independent judicial system and educational system, is robust putting India at an 
advantage. Particular credit is given to the banking infrastructure that was not deeply 
affected by the recent financial meltdown of the developed nations. 
 Kumar and Worm’s (2004) study provides a detailed examination of the various 
aspects of institutional environments in India and China in order to compare business 
negotiation processes. They note that while the regulatory environment can be a hurdle 
for investors in both nations, these barriers are more easily navigated in China than in 
India given the incentives for bureaucrats to promote economic growth in their regions. 
This has been substantiated by Sebastian, Parameswaran and Yahya (2006) in their 
examination of the Indian business environment via a survey of business managers.  
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Their results showed that Indian bureaucracy is viewed by a number of sources as 
tedious, vague and tiring.2 
 In a more comprehensive comparison of economic development in the two 
countries, Guruswamy and Singh (2010) focus on key differences in policies and 
performance.  As part of their analysis, the authors discuss China’s integration with Asia 
more generally as one distinct difference from India.  In this paper we argue that China’s 
timing and geographical relationship with Asia is the key factor for understanding the 
differential flows of FDI.  China’s post-Mao reforms began in the late 1970s, opening 
southern China to foreign investment and trade in the early 1980s at a historical moment 
when companies from Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan were looking for low 
cost manufacturing locations beyond their own borders.  Complementary to this was also 
the fact that the China option was geographically convenient, and was helped by similar 
cultural affinities, which led to the development of a manufacturing base that then built 
economies of scale and agglomeration.  This process led to infrastructure improvements, 
increased trade, technology spillovers and eventually spread effects to other parts of 
China.  Since India’s opening to foreign investment and trade was a decade, India was 
not an option for this particular wave of cost-seeking capital flows. 
 Our analysis fills an important gap in this literature.  There are very few studies 
that address the reasons for the large FDI differential between India and China, although 
this fact is well known.  Partly due to macro data compatibility and availability issues, 
econometric analysis of this question is problematic and when done, is not very 
informative.  Using a different approach, this paper carefully incorporates a series of 
country-level factors that have been identified in the literature as key to attracting FDI to 
provide a thorough analysis of the comparative competitiveness of China and India.   
 
FDI Location Literature: increasing importance of spatial concentration and 
alliances 
 FDI location has been studied in the literature with a focus on factors that push or 
pull companies to invest abroad (Krugman 1991, Porter 1994, Chen and Chen 1998, 
Majocchi and Strange 2007).  An early FDI framework was provided by Dunning (1977, 
1980)—the so-called eclectic approach to understanding the location decisions of foreign 
companies.  In addition, other studies such as Rugman and Verbeke (2001) and 
Andresson et al. (2002) show that international strategies are formulated to tap local 
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know-how and resources to increase competitiveness. In more recent work Dunning 
(2008) refined his ideas given the entrance of new participants such as China and India as 
viable investment locations as well as sources of outward investment.  He also expands 
on changes in the spatial dimension of FDI location, observing a paradox: although more 
nations have become welcoming to investment, concentration of production in certain 
locations has been more the norm, at least in certain sectors such as manufacturing.  
Clustering, then, encourages cooperative ventures and may help firms learn. He discusses 
the ‘contemporary network MNE’ in this context as a coordinator of a global system of 
value added activities referencing emerging economies of Asia as a testing ground for the 
interplay between institutional change at the macro level and organizational 
transformation at the micro level.  
Michael Porter’s work has also defined the development of this literature.  Porter 
(1998a) asked whether there are specific characteristics in a nation that result in firms that 
create and sustain competitive advantage in certain industries.   Porter argues that in this 
new age, when firms in different nations form alliances, those firms based in nations 
which support true competitive advantage eventually emerge as international leaders.  To 
succeed, competitive advantage can be created in two distinct ways—configuration and 
coordination.  Configuration is where a global firm spreads activities among nations to 
serve the world market; coordination is the ability of a global firm to manage 
productively the dispersed activities from manufacturing to distribution to marketing.  
Porter’s work on clusters recognized that while location remains fundamental to 
competition, its role has changed in terms of how companies should be configured, how 
institutions and ancillary industries can contribute to its continued success, and how 
governments can support economic development and prosperity.   
Along these lines, Contractor (2009) noted that cooperation among firms is an 
integral part of the new model for business in a globalized world and has made some 
sweeping changes in the global environment from liberalization of FDI rules, changing 
intellectual property rights, harmonization of standards and outsourcing of business 
functions.  With this business model the largest economic grouping is no longer a MNC 
but global industry networks consisting of companies that simultaneously compete and 
cooperate.  In line with Porter’s arguments, Contractor (2009) shows that the new 
alliance network economy provides more flexibility, lowers risk for each member 
company and speeds the response to changing markets more than is possible within a 
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single firm. The value chain is thus outsourced over several companies in different 




 In this paper we apply a broad scope of factors that are included in the concept of 
national competitiveness.  We draw primarily on Porter, since his work emphasizes the 
characteristics of nations that attract companies to invest.  Drawing particularly on the 
location and clustering aspects of FDI, our specific research proposition is as follows:  
 
We hypothesize that China had a fortunate combination of geographic location 
and timing that enabled firms to build alliances with other firms of multiple 
nations to meet the needs of international business at that time.  This happened 
both earlier and more completely than in India, thus attracting more FDI that in 
turn contributed to China’s increasing competitive advantage. 
 
Specifically, the establishment of the special economic zones in southern China in 
the early 1980s provided incentives, labor and infrastructure for foreign firms to 
locate there for low-cost, labor-intensive manufacturing.  As East Asian firms 
were central to the manufacturing supply chain at this time, moving to China was 
geographically and culturally convenient.  Once begun, a path-dependent 
virtuous cycle was set in motion that built an integrated supply-chain 
manufacturing base with economies of scale and agglomeration effects 
incorporating Chinese firms into this vital dynamic.   
 
Comparing levels of FDI and FDI performance 
 In this section we compare data on inward FDI to India and China to establish the 
differences and trends in FDI.  Based on the data in table 1, India in the 1970s had a lead 
in FDI compared to China.  However, while India’s FDI share fluctuated in the decade of 
the 1970s with a substantial rise in 1980, China was simultaneously opening to FDI and 
trade, resulting in an almost steady rise in FDI both from within Asia and the rest of the 
world.  Twenty years later, China became the world’s strongest magnet for overseas 
investment (Wei and Dutta, 2004).  Post 1980 the proportion of world FDI flowing to 
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India rapidly declined and despite liberalization in 1991, FDI remained low for the next 
two decades until 2006.  China’s large FDI differential over India is clearly reflected in 
these figures.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
 To further substantiate the differential in FDI between the two nations, table 2 
presents investment performance indices reported by UNCTAD.  The Inward FDI 
Performance Index is the ratio of a country´s share in global FDI inflows to its share in 
global GDP.  A value of one implies that the shares of global FDI flows and global GDP 
are equal while a value higher than one implies that the nation attracts more FDI than 
could be expected on the basis of its relative GDP size.  
 Based on the performance indices for these nations,  China consistently has 
attracted more FDI than would be expected based on its size. With the Asian crisis in 
1997, the performance index, while still greater than one, did substantially decline. This 
trend continued until the 2000s when it increased its FDI share once again only to decline 
again post 2005 and go below one for the first time since 1988. India showed a wholly 
different picture in terms of FDI performance. While remaining less than one throughout 
the period, it showed a steady increase except for a slight decline following the Asian 
crisis. In the more recent years, its FDI performance has been on the rise.  
 The Inward FDI Potential Index, in the second data column in table 2, captures 
several factors other than market size that are expected to affect an economy’s 
attractiveness to foreign investors.  It is constructed as the un-weighted average of the 
normalized values of several variables that correspond largely to the levels of economic 
development.3  It is an average of the values of the variables, normalized to yield a score 
between zero, for the lowest scoring country, to one, for the highest. This index shows 
that India lagged behind China over the three decades in its score for potential FDI.  
Moreover, China consistently increased in attractiveness to receive FDI over time, while 
India’s score remained almost constant since 1993 even though this is after India’s 
economic liberalization had begun in earnest. 4 










 We use Porter’s model, also known as the diamond framework, to explain the 
differences in the FDI that China has received as compared with India. Porter’s model 
includes four basic interacting elements that a nation can create resulting in advantages 
that are determinants of a nation’s competitive advantage.  He argues that each of these 
four elements individually, and as a whole, lead to a nation’s advantage or disadvantage 
in global markets.  
 
The elements of the diamond are described as follows.  
 
1.   Demand Conditions:  Higher demand in local markets leads to national advantage.  
Demand may include both the quantity demanded and the sophistication of the consumers 
in the home market.  For example, if the market for a product and its sophistication is 
largely local, then local firms devote more attention to that product than do foreign firms, 
leading to competitive advantage when the local firms begin exporting the product.  
 
2.   Factor Conditions:  Factors such as land, labor and capital that can be exploited by 
firms in the nation are seen as beneficial in advancing competitiveness of firms. As 
economies develop and compete, if they have not yet invested in such factors as 
infrastructure, skilled resources and technology, then this in itself is an opportunity for 
entrepreneurship and innovation. For instance, if a nation has a shortage of labor, firms 
may be motivated to automate or outsource its labor-intensive tasks. Therefore, having a 
good stock of endowments may be beneficial but is not sufficient to be competitive, just 
as lack of endowments does not have to be a permanent constraint for any given nation, 
especially because it creates opportunities for alliances among firms across nations.   
 
3.  Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry:  Local conditions affect firm strategy.  Firm 
strategy and structure help to determine in which types of industries a nation's firms will 
prosper.  In Porter’s model, less competition (low rivalry) makes an industry attractive 
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for entrants or incumbents. However, for an industry and a nation over the long-term, 
more local rivalry is better since it puts pressure on firms to innovate and improve, 
making it more likely that they will be able to successfully compete globally.  
 
4.   Related and Supporting Industries:  Ancillary businesses are needed by firms for parts 
of the value chain, such as suppliers and distributors who then support local industries. 
These include consultancies, contractors, outsourcing firms or any support firms that help 
in cost effectiveness and innovative inputs and outputs. This effect is strengthened when 
the suppliers themselves are strong global competitors. 
 
 Elements of the Porter’s diamond affect one another and depend on each other.   
For example, factor conditions will not lead firms to innovate unless there is sufficient 
rivalry.  Increased demand and consumer awareness will lead to increased local firms 
entering the market, thus increasing rivalry.  This increased rivalry should lead to more 
innovation, which increases the need for support industries to make the value chain 
stronger thus increasing growth and stimulating more demand. 
In addition to the basic diamond, Porter also notes two other variables can play an 
important role—government and chance.  He defines the role of government as that of a 
catalyst (or impediment) to encourage and support (or suppress) entrepreneurship and 
policies that help move firms in a nation to higher levels of competitive performance. 
Porter emphasized that government should encourage companies to raise their 
performance, stimulate early demand for advanced products, focus on specialized factor 
creation, stimulate local rivalry and enforce anti-trust regulations.  
Porter also recognized that chance can play a role in invention, entrepreneurship 
and competitive advantage.  He noted that chance events are important since they often 
create conditions that can shift competition in unexpected ways and alter conditions in 
the diamond.  While chance events can allow shifts in competitive advantage in an 
industry, a nation’s attributes play an important role in how a nation exploits them to its 
advantage.  Porter stated in his 1998a work, “The nation that has the most favorable 






Analysis and Discussion: Explaining the China-India FDI Differential 
Using Porter’s model of a nation’s competitive advantage, we present a 
comparative analysis of the two countries’ determinants in order to identify the 
differentiators that may explain the large FDI flows to China as compared with India.  
  
1. Demand conditions 
 Countries gain a competitive advantage and hence are more attractive when they 
present an untapped market share for goods and services as well as a growing 
sophisticated and healthier customer base.  India and China are both attractive from this 
angle with large populations defining potentially underserved markets, with substantial 
increases in levels of income over time.    
 China’s official population was 981 million in 1980, and India’s was 687 million. 
In 2008, China still surpassed India at 1.32 billion while India’s population was 1.14 
billion. India is expected to surpass China in the future since India’s growth rate was 
substantially higher at 1.34 percent per year compared with China’s 0.55 percent in 2008 
(World Databank). 
 In addition to the population demographics, in the last decade both nations have 
seen increases in per capita incomes creating additional capacity for consumption. 
However, these trends have changed over time.  In 1980 India had a higher GDP per 
capita at $229 compared with China’s $186 (World Bank Databank).  China had just 
opened its markets in 1979.  Since then, China grew very rapidly and in the last three 
decades has witnessed almost a doubling of its GDP per capita, so that by 2008 China’s 
GDP per capita had reached $5,083 while India’s had reached only $2,600.  Since 2001, 
however, India’s growth has improved to 5.6 percent per year compared with 3.2 percent 
between 1980 and 2000.  Still, China continued to grow quickly with GDP per capita 
growing at 8.1 percent in the first two decades and 9.3 percent between 2000 and 2008. 
 While China is ahead of India by these measures, both countries have seen 
impressive growth.  In the early 1980s India was ahead, with China surpassing India’s 
GDP per capita in the middle of that decade and sustaining that differential.  China’s 
growth spurt was due in part to its ability early on to attract FDI, while India had not yet 
liberalized its foreign investment regime.  In addition, if market size is taken into account 
as with the figures in table 2, China still received significantly more FDI than India.  But 
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the demand factor alone is not very helpful in explaining this differential, as both had 
very large demand potential.   
  
2. Factor Conditions:  
 Much of the classical literature in international development notes that countries 
with a relatively large pool of transportation and telecom infrastructure, technology and a 
skilled labor force offer advantages and thus attract FDI.    
 
Infrastructure:  
 The most common reason cited in the press and manager surveys for China’s lead 
in FDI over India is better infrastructure.  In India, infrastructure is seen as an 
impediment to growth of the manufacturing sector, where gains made through low labor 
costs are overshadowed by loses due to bottlenecks especially in power supply and 
transportation (Walker 2006).   Two related points provide perspective in this regard.  
First, the differences in infrastructure perceived today did not always exist.  In the early 
1980s, infrastructure was underdeveloped in both countries, and by some measures was 
superior in India (Patel and Bhattacharya, 2010, p.53).  Second, from Porter’s 
perspective, infrastructure development is endogenous, meaning that its development will 
occur to meet the demands for it.  An example would be Infosys owners threatening to 
move their headquarters as a way to lobby the Indian government for a new airport in 
Bangalore.  Huang (2008, p.268) argues that China responded to the needs of foreign 
investors once firms had been encouraged to invest.  This process began in southern 
China, just north of the border with Hong Kong, in the early 1980s.  China began by 
building infrastructure in special economic zones, partly because the conditions for 
investment throughout China were very poor.   
 As a result, China’s physical infrastructure has improved significantly and while 
its electricity supply and communications infrastructure remain weak, its physical 
infrastructure with roads and railways is substantially better and has grown faster than 
India’s.  Since the early 1990s, India's growing economy has witnessed a rise in demand 
for transport infrastructure and services.  Most highways in India are underdeveloped 
with narrow roads and a majority of India’s cities are not well connected nor do they have 
access to all-weather roads. The dramatic increase in air traffic for both passengers and 
cargo in recent years has placed a heavy strain on the country's major airports. While 
13 
 
India has only recently begun to take steps in this area, China’s physical infrastructure 
has improved significantly due to massive government spending during the last three 
decades.  
 Tables 3 and 4 present recent statistics comparing communication and 
transportation infrastructure in the two countries.  In India, fixed and mobile telephone 
density is relatively low with mobile subscribers at about 21 for each 100 persons 
nationwide while China is much higher at 42 subscribers per 100 persons.  A comparison 
of the internet infrastructure in the two countries shows that China has had a higher 
percent of users and penetration of internet, but the percent of user growth was higher in 
India between 2000 and 2008.  In terms of Internet bandwidth and electric power 
consumption, however, India lags behind China.  India has 12 major and 187 minor and 
intermediate ports along its more than 7,600 km long coastline. In comparison, China has 
16 large scale ports along its eastern and southern border.  India’s inland water 
transportation, however, remains a challenge. In aviation, and roadways, China has made 
major strides relative to India, with higher number of airports and doubling of roadways 
in the recent years. 
 
[Tables 3 and 4 here] 
 
 Based on data from the World Bank enterprise survey of infrastructure constraints 
as perceived by firms, both nations have room for improvement especially in comparison 
to OECD nations and, in most cases, compared to East Asia and Pacific nations as well.   
For instance, the time taken to get an electricity connection is about the same in both 
nations, while firms in India reported a greater loss due to electricity constraints.  While a 
slightly higher percentage of firms in India identify electricity as a major constraint, a 
higher percentage of Chinese firms report transportation as being the major blockade in 
doing business (World Bank Enterprise Survey).   
  
Technology: 
 The Global Information Technology Forum’s report (World Economic Forum) 
compares countries’ readiness with regard to technology. This is useful in comparing the 
two nations in terms of their technology preparedness.  The report discusses how 
countries leverage information communication technology (ICT) for growth and 
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development using the Networked Readiness Index (NRI).  Based on a mix of hard data 
and firm surveys, the NRI is broken down into three components—environment, 
readiness and usage.  In the overall index, India outperformed China from 2002 to 2007, 
but then China pulled ahead of India in the last two years of reported data (2008-09).   
The components of the index indicate that India lags China in infrastructure but that the 
market environment is better. The political and regulatory environment is also more 
receptive in India for much of this decade. At the individual and business level, India 
outranks China, but the Chinese government is more prepared for change than the Indian 
government, according to these data.  In usage of ICT, India lags behind China in all 
three areas, which includes the individual, business and governmental areas.   
 
Labor Force: 
 On average China has a larger workforce than India, both in terms of permanent 
full time employees as well as temporary or seasonal employees (World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys).  This is largely due to the higher participation of women in the workforce in 
China.  However, while in China the percentage of workers who are unskilled is much 
higher than in India—86 percent compared with 36—in terms of the absolute number of 
skilled workers, the two countries are on par.  
 India has a younger workforce compared to China.  Over 94.7 percent of the 
population is less than 65 years old and over 30 percent are under 14.   China has about 
91 percent of the population under 65 but has only about 18 percent of the population that 
are younger than 14.  However, two factors that work against India is that it has a much 
lower literacy rate than China (61 percent compared to 91 percent in China) and a smaller 
urban population (29 percent compared to 43 percent) (World Databank).  
 While wage comparisons are difficult to make across nations, Ashenfelter and 
Jurajda (2001) found that basic wage rates for India were lower than in China. Wei’s 
(2005) results suggested that lower labor costs in India explain some of that country’s 
FDI inflows.  The Global Wage Report (ILO, 2008) data also indicate that wages on 
average are lower in India than in China.  Using a purchasing power parity exchange with 
the US dollar, the minimum wage in India was 113 as compared to 204 in China as of 
2007 or later.  Between 2001 and 2007, the minimum wage in China grew over 8 percent 
while in India it increased less than 2 percent (ILO, 2008, Table A2).  Average real 
wages grew in China over 9 percent between 1995 and 2000 and over 12 percent between 
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2001 and 2007.  For the same time periods India’s average wages grew less than 2 
percent.5  China’s new labor law, adopted in 2009 and implemented in January 2010, has 
also reportedly added to labor costs since these data were collected.  
 Overall the comparison of factor conditions is mixed, with China ahead with 
some and India ahead in others.  Both countries have made major progress with 
infrastructure, but weaknesses remain in both places (Patel and Bhattacharya 2010, Bai 
and Qian 2010).  India has a younger workforce, but with less literacy overall.  Both 
countries have relatively low wages for both skilled and unskilled labor.  As a key 
differentiator in the flow of FDI, it is difficult to argue that these factor conditions have 
been the main variable, especially if we consider the flows of FDI since the early 1980s.    
 
3. Firm Strategy, structure and rivalry: 
 A third part of Porter’s diamond emphasizes local conditions that affect firm-
related factors, i.e., how firms are created, organized and managed, and the benefits of 
rivalry or competition.  Ceteris paribus, if a country makes it easier for firms to enter the 
markets and free competition exists, it attracts FDI.  The pattern of rivalry at home also 
shapes the process of expansion, corporate culture, innovation and growth for firms.  In 
terms of ease of entering the markets or doing business within these nations, China and 
India appear fairly on par.   
 While China and India have been liberalizing and attempting to increase 
competition in their home markets, foreign firms still face serious challenges in entering 
both of these markets.   Table 5 reports key indicators from the World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys.  Although there is some variation between China and India in terms of the 
specific entry constraints reported in these surveys, overall neither country scores well.  
While many more firms report having difficulty and needing to pay to obtain licenses and 
permits in China than India, more firms in India report the need to pay gifts to get basic 
things accomplished such as obtaining an import license, installing a phone and obtaining 
access to electric power.  Incidence of graft is higher in India, but high in both nations, 
while firms identifying corruption as a major constraint is about the same in both 
countries at about one quarter of the firms surveyed.    
 




 Another firm level issue that is influenced by local conditions is the mode of entry 
of FDI, whereby the modes of expansion and the options available within each country 
attract FDI differently. The relationship between mode of FDI choice and the nation’s 
competitive environment has been examined in recent literature (e.g., Mattoo, Olarreagaz 
and Saggi 2001, Muller 2006).  The preferred choice of mode of entry is often a trade-off 
between technology transfer and market structure and competition in the host nation. The 
choice of affiliate ownership structure can be very complex since it is contingent on 
national, industrial, organizational and project factors (Luo, 2001).  The pattern of rivalry 
and the level and ease of entering these markets are reflected in the modes of FDI that 
these nations promote.  If companies are choosing between Greenfield, joint ventures and 
merger and acquisition (M&A) investments as the mode for FDI, the preferred mode 
typically depends on the suitability of targets, the competitive situation and other 
characteristics specific to the industry in question.  While mode of entry in itself may not 
suffice to explain the FDI differential within the two nations, if more firms enter into one 
nation versus the other in a particular form, it may be one indicator of whether firm entry 
constraints or some other factor is affecting the FDI flow differently in one nation as 
compared with the other (Thursby and Thursby, 2006).6  
 Greenfield investments are increasingly common in R&D expansions abroad 
(UNCTAD).  They are attractive since they bring in new equity capital investments and 
create jobs in the host nation.   Based on data from UNCTAD from 2002 to 2004, China 
saw 581 Greenfield investments in 2002 that more than doubled the following year to 
1299 and increased further to 1529 by 2004.7  In sharp contrast, India had less than half 
of China’s investments for the corresponding year with 250 Greenfield investments for 
FY 2002, which grew to 457 in FY 2003 and 685 the following year, FY 2004.  
 While globally, joint ventures and strategic alliances are increasingly common 
particularly in the R&D area (Thursby and Thursby, 2006), joint ventures in China and 
India have not been popular and may not help in explaining the differential in FDI due to 
firm entry constraints caused by mode of entry restrictions.  Based on data from SDC 
(Thomson SDC, 2010) on joint ventures in India and China, excluding same country joint 
ventures, in India from 1985 to 2009 there were very few joint ventures—5 from 
Singapore and 4 each from the UK and USA.  For China, between 1983 and 2009, there 
were only 131 joint ventures.  Hong Kong, Singapore and the U.S. dominated the joint 
ventures with China. 
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 If an acquisition results in advancing market positioning and some R&D activities 
are included in the takeover deal, M&A may be favored over joint ventures and strategic 
alliances (UNCTAD).  Cross-border M&As generally represent the fastest means of 
building up a strong position in a new market, gaining market power, and indeed, market 
dominance and competitive strength.   In terms of firm structure and competition, cross 
border mergers and acquisitions appear to have been the most attractive entry mode for 
both nations.  Based on the SDC data on mergers and acquisitions, in China there were a 
total of 10 M&A transactions (1 from within China) in the 1980s while India witnessed 
25 M&As (11 of them were among Indian companies) in the same decade. The 1990s 
witnessed a 116 fold increase to 1,049 M&As in China from outside nations, while India 
witnessed a 52 fold increase to 738 M&As for the same period.  While the 1990s saw a 
boom in the mergers and acquisitions markets with a continued rapid increase from East 
Asia, Europe and the United States, the pace slowed down in the 2000s compared to the 
earlier decade. India had a four-fold increase in the cross border M&A market and a five-
fold increase was witnessed in the Chinese M&A scene in the 2000s.    
 In sum, both India and China appear to present similar challenges to foreign 
investors with respect to modes of entry.   Greenfield investment became a viable option 
late in both countries; joint ventures have not been very common in either market; and 
both countries have benefitted about the same from M&A activity.   Hence differences in 
local conditions affecting firm level factors are not very powerful in explaining the larger 
FDI flows to China as compared with India.  
 
4. Related and Supporting Industries: 
 
 Porter stated that competitive supplier industries can provide “efficient, early, 
rapid, and preferential access to inputs,” which are basic production needs (1998a) More 
linkages within an industry attract more FDI, ceteris paribus.  With the advent of 
outsourcing and global production networks, these linkages, both forward and backward, 
become a critical and essential catalyst for FDI attraction.  Porter described these clusters 
as geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and institutions in a given 
industry or area (Porter 1998b).  He argued that the enduring competitive advantages in a 
global economy are often heavily local, arising from concentrations of highly specialized 
skills, knowledge, institutions and rivals, related businesses and sophisticated customers.   
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These clusters could be horizontal or vertical in nature and indicate the presence of 
support industries that could assist in the supply chain process thus creating competitive 
advantage which would attract FDI.8   
 Similar to clusters, networks are alliances of firms that work together towards an 
economic goal. They can be established between firms within clusters but also exist 
outside clusters.  Networks can be horizontal and vertical. Horizontal networks are built 
between firms that compete for the same market, such as a group of producers 
establishing a joint retail shop.  Vertical networks are alliances between firms belonging 
to different levels of the same value chain, such as a buyer assisting its suppliers for 
upgrading (UNIDO). 
 Many studies have focused on the development of clusters and production 
networks in East Asia (e.g., Ernst & Kim 2002, Naughton 1997, Sohn 2002, Chen and 
Liu 1998, Chen et al. 2007, Gaulier et al. 2009, Ando and Kimura 2003, Saxenian 2002, 
Yusuf et al. 2008, Guruswamy and Singh 2010).  These studies support the argument that 
China’s manufacturing advantage has come about partly because of its 
interconnectedness with the global supply chain. The large number of supply clusters in 
China has contributed significantly to the nation’s manufacturing competitiveness, both 
because of competition (or rivalry in Porter’s terms) and because of the spillover benefits 
from the agglomeration of industry.   Further, these firms in China are globally 
connected, which helps them with upgrading and expansion opportunities.  While this 
process has been concentrated in southern China because of the early establishment of the 
special economic zones in the south, other parts of the country are also now linked, such 
as the Beijing-Tianjin corridor and the Yangzi Valley area from Shanghai to Nanjing to 
the west.   
 India also has clusters and global linkages, but the historical development has 
been quite different.  In India domestically-oriented, family-owned conglomerates have 
been in existence for a long time. According to a UNIDO survey of Indian Small Scale 
Industries (SSI) clusters undertaken in 1996, there were 350 SSI clusters and 
approximately 2000 rural and artisan based clusters.  It was estimated that these clusters 
contributed 60% of the manufactured exports from India.9    In addition to the more 
traditional small scale rural manufacturing clusters in the clothing sector, India has also 
developed significant global linkages to software services and auto manufacturing 
(Gereffi and Guler 2010, Basant 2008, Gregory et al. 2009).   
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 Despite such achievements, the majority of the Indian clusters share significant 
constraints such as technological obsolescence, relatively poor product quality, 
information deficiencies, poor market linkages and inadequate management systems.   
They are also focused on the domestic market and poorly linked to global supply and 
marketing networks.  This is a major difference as compared with China, and is essential 
for understanding the FDI differential.10  One indicator of the consequence of this 
difference is that China’s share of exports in 2008 that were classified as high-tech was 
24 percent as compared with India’s 2 percent (World Databank).      
 
5. The role of government and institutions: 
 In addition to the core diamond framework, Porter also considers the role of 
government and institutions, and chance, in understanding the determinants of 
competitiveness.  Porter emphasized the role of government in advancing a nation’s 
agenda in economic development and competitiveness. Government is critical for 
competitiveness since it sets policy, but other supporting institutions such as the legal 
system are critical for sustaining competitive advantage for any nation.  The private 
sector is also a crucial actor in improving competitiveness and in influencing economic 
policy since they are most impacted by the investment environment.  
 Doing business in either country has its bureaucratic hurdles.  The two countries 
require about the same time and effort to start a business, and they have different and yet 
equally difficult firm entry constraints (World Bank Enterprise Survey).   India has a 
democratic representative government with stronger legal and financial systems, more 
political freedom, unrestricted information flow, and a more established private sector.  
India was also an original member of the WTO and a member of GATT from the 
beginning.  China has an underdeveloped legal system and joined WTO only in 2001, has 
less economic freedom, controlled access to information and questionable protection of 
private property. Yet even with these apparent relative institutional advantages in India, 
much more FDI has flowed to China.  
 Policy is the key here.  While India’s institutions may be stronger, the 
ambivalence in government policy has affected the environment for FDI in terms of 
programmatic initiatives adopted to promote or impede business development.  For 
example, India has adopted public-private partnerships in infrastructure development 
programs, while in China more than 90 percent of the infrastructure development has 
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been through government funding.  In India multinationals often build their own 
campuses with self contained power generation because the public supply is inadequate.  
In China, partnering with local government and/or locating in a development zone have 
been the main routes to access to utilities.  In addition, as discussed in Henley (2004), 
local governments in China were given incentives to attract FDI while this was not the 
case in India.   
 As Meredith (2007) notes, while India is democratic and China is authoritarian, 
capitalistic India is often anti-business and communist China is usually pro-business.  
China's leadership sees economic growth as the key to retaining its hold on power, 
increasing influence in the world and strengthening the military to cope with threats to 
national security. In contrast, fifty years of socialist dogma and policies have left India 
with political and bureaucratic hurdles that constrain rewards for enterprise, initiative and 
merit on the one hand, and the operation of the price mechanism on the other. Chinese 
leaders, as part of their longer-term strategic vision, have focused on promoting English 
language and information technology skills, backed by the necessary telecommunications 
and power infrastructure, while in India the IT sector’s success is largely attributed to its 
nature and speed that caused it to escape government control and regulation (Thakur 
2003; Yardley 2011).   Hence, in China firms must work on developing good government 
relations while in India it is best to avoid government. Both have their drawbacks.   
 So far we have explored all but one aspect of Porter’s model. While, demand, 
factor conditions, and firm strategy, structure and rivalry show differences between China 
and India, these are not significant enough to explain the very large FDI differential.  The 
factors tied to related and supporting industries, and the role of government and 
institutions, begin to tell the story.  China’s leaders decided to exploit the global market 
place for development about a decade earlier than India, and designed policy to explicitly 
attract and serve foreign firms.  Clusters of industries with strong linkages to the global 
economy were also formed earlier in China, and thus became deeper as a result.   We turn 
now to the additional factor that has not been fully recognized in the literature—‘the 








6. The Chance Factor: timing and location  
 The last of Porter’s factors that gives a nation competitive advantage is not easily 
quantifiable.  Recognizing that not all business success is based on careful planning and 
brilliant strategies, Porter includes “chance” as a factor that may create competitive 
advantage for nations.  We argue that China’s success with FDI as compared to India can 
be largely attributed to ‘chance’ being a catalyst; i.e., being located at the right 
geographic proximity and adopting reforms at a propitious time.   
 At the time that China began to open to international markets in the early 1980s, 
East Asian development had advanced to the point where companies were seeking lower 
costs.  The processes of urbanization and industrialization in East Asia drove up labor 
and land costs.  Industrialization increased demand for factory labor, while urbanization 
gradually drained the countryside of underemployed, low-paid agricultural labor that had 
provided armies of workers willing to labor for low (but still higher than agricultural) 
wages in the early stages of industrialization.  Growing demand combined with limited 
supply of labor had begun to drive up wages.  Rising living standards and democratic 
transitions in South Korea and Taiwan in the late 1980s further added to labor militancy 
and demands for higher wages.  Similar dynamics operated regarding land costs.  The 
East Asian countries were all densely populated with mountainous geography.  Land near 
transportation lines was increasingly expensive.  Growing environmental consciousness 
and consequent government regulation led to further cost increases.  And the rise of the 
value of the yen in the mid-1980s added substantially to Japan’s costs.  In highly 
competitive global markets, these rising costs began to hurt the demand for East Asian 
goods, threatening to undermine continued growth.  One response to this competitive 
challenge was to shift labor intensive, and sometimes polluting, manufacturing operations 
from these home countries to some place abroad.  Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and 
especially Hong Kong are located on China’s doorstep.  China began encouraging FDI in 
the early 1980s, and within a short time period, low-end manufacturing production 
moved to the special economic zones in southern China.  Hong Kong played a pivotal 
role providing expertise, a legal environment and logistics in those early days when 
China was just beginning to develop these aspects of a business environment.    
 Unlike China in the 1980s, India had no such external impetus to push forward its 
FDI agenda.  India’s FDI has not been concentrated from any one nation or region.  Some 
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studies have identified overseas Chinese as an important source of FDI into China (Gao, 
2003, Lo & Liu 2009) whereas this has been more limited in India (Lall, 2001).11   
Saxenian (2002) emphasizes the linkages with nationals with specialized education and 
experience that allow the formation of global professional networks that promote new 
industries and innovations.  Her study shows that these networks are more developed vis-
à-vis China than India.   These factors are consistent with East Asian companies taking 
advantage of new opportunities within China as a substantial portion of the FDI came 
from Hong Kong and Taiwan.   Well over half of China’s FDI has gone into 
manufacturing, while in India FDI has concentrated in the power and telecom sectors 
(Henley, 2004).   The character of China’s exports—the fact that over 50 percent of 
China’s exports are produced by firms with foreign investment, that the value-added of 
these exports tended to start low and rise, and that final sales are heavily weighted 
towards the major developed markets of the north America and the E.U.—is evidence of 
China’s role in the Asian production networks (Sung 2007, Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci 
2004).   
 Consistent with this argument,  Wu et al. (2006) argue that China’s manufacturing 
cost advantage over other nations was not merely due to the low cost of labor but more so 
because of the existence of supply clusters and China’s geographic proximity to these 
global production networks. They argue that if labor costs were the main reason, other 
nations such as Vietnam and Zimbabwe should have benefited, since they have far lower 
costs than China. They also point out that most of China’s production capacity for export 
goods is located in the four or five eastern provinces in the coastal regions where wages 
and cost of living and prices for production are usually the highest in the country. The 
Chinese advantage goes beyond labor costs and is specifically reflected in the developed 
value chain, including sourcing for manufacturing, logistics, warehousing, and storage.  
 There has been nothing comparable in India until very recently.  Over half of the 
FDI flowing to India is funneled via Mauritius (Wei 2005), but this is for tax purposes 
rather than for economic reasons.  India began opening to global markets in earnest only 
in 1991.  By then China had a decade of experience with how to best attract FDI with 
minimal political and economic backlash.  This put China in a good position to absorb the 
rising private capital flows that occurred during the 1990s.  With improving production 
quality and expanding clusters of capabilities with supporting services, China became an 
agglomeration of low cost manufacturing that then encouraged other firms to follow.  
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This was an historical moment for equipment manufacturing, especially in 
telecommunications and information technology, which most likely will not be replicated 
elsewhere.   
 China’s trading and investment partners provide additional evidence to support 
the East Asian production networks proposition.  China’s exports in 1990 were heavily 
dependent on East Asia, with 61.9 percent being sold there (table 6).  Hong Kong was the 
largest with 43.3 percent of China’s export market share.  Japan followed with 14.7 
percent.  Imports from East Asia made up 16.2 percent of the total, with Japan being the 
largest import partner at 14.2 percent.  By 2008 East Asia’s share had fallen to 29 percent 
for exports and 24.6 percent for imports.   In line with this, Chia (2007) analyzed Japan’s 
FDI to Asia noting that the largest flows went to China, outstripping flows to ASEAN4 
plus Singapore, although ASEAN has caught up in 2006.   
 
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
 
 In contrast, in 1990, India was still largely following the bilateral trade process 
with rudimentary building production networks, if any.  As see in Table 6, 14.2 percent 
of India’s exports were sold to Japan and Hong Kong, and another 1.7 percent went to 
Singapore.  The U.S. was India’s largest export destination with 15.1 percent.  Exports to 
China represented only 0.1 percent.   The U.S. was also India’s top country for imports 
with 11.0 percent while East Asia made up 11.9 percent.  By 2008, India’s exports to East 
Asia were 21.6 percent, with 11.1 percent going to China.  China was India’s largest 
country for imports in 2008, with 11.9 percent.  East Asia together represented 22.1 
percent.  The trends indicate that East Asia has grown in importance for India, but largely 
because of its growing trade with China. 
 Trade and foreign investment tend to be closely tied, and in recent years this has 
been compounded by the growing share of intermediate goods in total world trade 
(Hanson et al. 2005).  While cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is only one 
mode of inward FDI, it provides evidence of a trend in both direction and magnitude of 
FDI.  Data on the value of cross-border M&A transactions over the three decades is 
presented in table 7 showing that China received about two and half times more capital 
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via cross-border M&A transactions than India for the three decades ($243 million as 
opposed to $104 million).  While none of the East Asian nations and Japan invested any 
M&A dollars in the 1980s with India, China received $74 million; $10 million from 
Japan and $50 million from UK and $2 million from HK. China received a large boost in 
capital of 453 times in value terms from the 1980s to the 1990s.   This we argue made all 
the difference since it helped build China-centric production networks that moved East 
Asian trade to the forefront for the next two decades following the 1980s.  
 By the mid 1990s, as China began to expand and become increasingly more 
attractive as a location for global production networks, the push for cross-border  M&As 
was welcomed in China. With the East Asian tigers and Japan, China’s foreign invested 
export industry became a key driver of China’s development. As reflected in the 
numbers, China’s inward FDI in the form of cross-border M&As increased impressively 
from 73 million in the 1980s to 32 billion in the 1990s. The majority of this FDI was 
from East Asia, Japan and the U.S.   For India, while the 1990s was also a period of 
liberalization, with limited production networks, India’s cross-border M&A grew to $5 
billion in the 1990s, an increase of 60 times compared to the 1980s.  However, the FDI in 
form of cross border M&As was not weighted toward one or a group of nations as in the 
case of China.  
 The 2000s also saw a further increase in cross-border M&A dollars into China but 
the pace slowed relative to the earlier decade and the differential between the two nations 
narrowed. While China continued to receive most of the M&A dollars from Hong Kong, 
U.S., Japan and Singapore, during this decade other nations also poured dollars via 
M&As into China.  India saw a larger proportionate increase in the 2000s and grew about 
19 fold from the 1990s to $99 billion.  As in other decades, India’s M&A dollars were 
not concentrated from any one country or region.  In sum, these trends underscore the 
importance of East Asian trade and investment in China’s development story. 
 
[Table 7 here] 
 







 This evidence of trade and FDI lend support for our hypothesis that China had the 
right combination of economic history and timing that enabled its building of alliances 
with other nations in the form of production networks.  This process began a decade 
earlier than India positioning China as a better place to receive FDI. China’s early entry 
into East Asian production networks was happenstance due to its geographical location, 
and while opening to the global economy by establishing special economic zones was a 
conscious policy, the timing of it was coincidental.12 Together, the timing and location of 
building these alliances has been a key factor pushing China ahead of India in terms of 
FDI.   
One view of this result is that while India’s lower volume of FDI compared to 
China may not be worrisome in itself, FDI as a vehicle for technology transfer and a 
mechanism for accessing global markets provides an advantage in terms of market 
positioning. FDI helps tie local companies into international production networks that 
bring together component suppliers, assemblers, supply chain managers and buyers. 
Domestic firms can increase their productivity by accessing technology and management 
practices from foreign partners, which enhances their international competitiveness 
(Ernest and Kim 2002).  A recent contribution to this line of reasoning is Breznitz and 
Murphee (2011) who argue that China’s process innovation capability is due to just these 
types of connections to global firms.  Following our argument, India would not have the 
same innovation dynamics, at least in manufacturing.   
 Another view is that the now more developed India perhaps does not need FDI as 
a conduit to development as it might have in the past.  An empirical study by Kose et al. 
(2007) suggests that emerging market economies have become less tied to the 
industrialized economies because they have been decoupling.  In recent years India’s 
former self-reliance resulting in a strong domestic sector seems to be paying off and its 
emphasis on ‘homegrown’ entrepreneurship is poised to become its key ingredient for 
economic success. India has managed to spawn a number of reputable companies able to 
compete internationally with the best of Europe and the United States.  Many of these 
firms are in knowledge-based industries, such as software giants Infosys and Wipro and 
Ranbaxy and Dr Reddy's Labs in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors, just to 
name a few.  Further, for the emerging economies, intra-group trade became relatively 
more important than trade with industrial countries, while the group’s economic 
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structures have become increasingly similar. Another recent paper by Kaur (2009) 
proposes that the statistical patterns of convergence and decoupling may be analogous to 
the flying geese pattern of shifting comparative advantage, with more advanced 
economies moving up in sophistication and passing the baton to other emerging 
economies. She argues that there is a change in the degree of vertical specialization in 
global production networks, with supply chain management now allowing different 
production stages to be spread across more locations. India’s strength in services has 
created a competitive advantage in the coordination of these activities across firms and 
across nations (Ghani, Grover and Kharas 2011).  
 Decoupling has also received a lot of attention with respect to China in the wake 
of the 2008-09 global financial crisis.  If China can grow without the U.S., in particular, 
then China can be instrumental in pulling the U.S., and the global economy, out of 
recession.  Much discussion has focused on the need for China to shift to domestic 
demand as its engine of growth with less reliance on exports, especially after the decline 
in demand from the developed economies in the wake of the crisis (e.g., Qi and Prime 
2009).  Official policy in China recognizes this as a goal, and steps have been taken.  To 
date, however, China’s exports continue to grow, as does its foreign exchange reserves.  
India is much less reliant on the global economy for its growth, and hence has weathered 
the crisis well.     
 By the 2000s, the FDI differential between China and India continued but inward 
investment to India increased quickly (Table 1).  Over the decade India’s economy 
increasingly integrated with the East Asian economies, giving it some of the advantages 
that China has enjoyed for some time.  Infrastructure has improved in India, but more 
needs to be done.  Perhaps now the pressure to invest in infrastructure will be sufficient 
to ease these constraints.  India’s higher growth has stimulated rising incomes there with 
new domestic market opportunities for domestic and foreign firms alike.   
 As the two nations grow and knowledge transfer diffuses into these economies, one 
can expect new symbiotic relationships with other nations in the new age of strategic 
alliances.  For example, Japan has begun to view India as a place with substantial 
investment and manufacturing potential.  Due to very limited political and economic 
history with India, Japan's latest approach to India has so far also been reciprocated and 
well-received by Indian businesses that have traditionally been looking west.   India’s 
increased trade with Japan, and East Asia generally, in part reflects this new direction of 
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global ties.  Secondly, China’s FDI structure is likely to change as its networks evolve.  It 
may be, for example, that the next stage of global production will see some FDI leaving 
China because of rising costs, and more FDI going to India to take advantage of India’s 
high-skilled knowledge workers.  Thirdly, companies from both countries have become 
multinationals in their own right, investing in many markets around the world.  Finally, at 
the same time, India and China are becoming closer economically, with China representing 
India’s largest import market and the second largest export market in 2008.  How policies 
change in these two nations’ as they go forward with cooperation while also competing 
remains to be seen.      
 
Conclusion 
 This paper identifies reasons for the large differential in FDI received by China 
over India. The FDI differential is a puzzle since the two nations are geographically 
similar in that they are large, populous continental economies that have gone through 
similar stages of transition and development over the past three decades. We address this 
issue by identifying factors that attract FDI within the context of national competitiveness 
as laid out by Porter.  We first examine the four parts of Porter’s diamond.  Differences 
are established but none of these four stands out as obvious explanations for such a large 
FDI differential.   
 We argue that the differential is largely due to China’s fortuitous ‘location and 
timing’ that placed China in the center of the building of production networks with East 
Asian investment beginning in the early 1980s. Alongside, resolute government policy 
and programmatic initiatives adopted to promote business development in China (as 
opposed to India) helped strengthen China’s competitiveness earlier and more 
successfully than India.  A case in point is the establishment of the special economic 
zones in southern China in the early 1980s that provided incentives, labor and 
infrastructure for foreign firms to locate there for low-cost, labor-intensive 
manufacturing.  Simultaneously, East Asian firms were central to the manufacturing 
supply chain, especially driven by electronic equipment, thus, moving to China was 
geographically and culturally convenient. This placed China in the center of the East 
Asian building production network; an opportunity that India missed at the time.   
 Our analysis covers the key conditions that are typically addressed in the 
literature, but we are limited by the lack of systematic econometric data that would allow 
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us to measure the relative importance of our variables.  In this sense understanding the 
attractiveness of these two economies to FDI covers many “eclectic” reasons that 
Dunning described so well.  In sum, China and India have developed in very different 
ways and so a systematic comparison will yield multiple reasons for differences in 
results. What is clear is that China has attracted and utilized much more FDI than India, 
and it seems unlikely that India will catch up in this respect, at least for some time to 
come.  At this point we cannot say which path will be the most successful over the long-








Ajami, R.A., 2010. Global realignment: The arrival of Asia’s economic giants. Journal of 
Asia-Pacific Business, 11 (4), 241-243. 
 
Andresson, U., M. Forsgren and U. Holm, 2002. The strategic impact of external 
networks: subsidiary performance and competence development in the 
multinational corporation. Strategic Management Journal,  23(11), 979-996. 
 
Ando, A. and Kimura, F., 2003. The formation of international production and distribution 
networks in East Asia. NBER Working Paper no. 10167. 
 
Ashenfelter, O. and Jurajda, S., 2001. Cross-country comparisons of wage rates: The big 
Mac index. Working paper. Princeton University and CERGE-EI/Charles University.  
 
Bai, C.E. and Qian, Q., 2010. Infrastructure development in China: The cases of electricity, 
highways, and railways. Journal of Comparative Economics, 38 (1), 34-51. 
 
Basant, R., 2008. Bangalore cluster: Evolution, growth, and challenges. In S. Yusuf, K. 
Nabeshima, and S. Yamashita, eds. Growing industrial serendipity and science.  
Washington DC: The World Bank, 147–193. 
 
Breznitz, D. and Murphree, M., 2011, Run of the Red Queen: Government, Innovation, 
Globalization, and Economic Growth in China.  New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Chen, H. and Chen T.J., 1998, Network linkages and location choice in foreign direct 
investment.  Journal of International Business Studies, 29 (3), 445-468. 
 
Chen, T.J. and Liu, M.C., 1998. Production networks and patterns of trade: Evidence from 
Taiwan. Pacific Economic Review, 3 (1), 49-69. 
 
Chen, C.H., Mai, C.C., and Shih, C.T., 2007. China and East Asia: An appraisal of regional 
economic integration. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 48 (3), 320-340. 
 
Chia, S.Y., 2007. Whither East Asian regionalism? An ASEAN perspective.  Asian 
Economic Papers, 6 (3), 1-36. 
 
Contractor, F., 2009. Capitalism’s future lies in networks and cooperation. Yale Global 
Online Magazine, Available from: http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/print/5578 
 
Dunning, J.H., 1977, Trade, Location of Economic Activity and the NME: A Search for 
an Eclectic Approach.  In Bertil Ohlin, Per-Ove Hesselborn, and Per Magnus 
Wikman, eds. The International Allocation of Economic Activity.  London: 




Dunning, J.H., 1980, Toward an Eclectic Theory of International Production: Some 
Empirical Tests, Journal of International Business Studies 11(1), 9-31. 
 
Dunning, J.H., 1998, Location and the multinational enterprise: a neglected 
 factor?, Journal of International Business Studies, 29(1), 45-66. 
 
Dunning, J.H., 2008, Space, Location and Distance in IB Activities: A Changing Scenario. 
PP.83-110 in John H. Dunning and Philippe Gugler, eds., Foreign Direct Investment, 
Location and Competitiveness, Vol 2 Progress in International Business Research. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier.  
 
Ernst, D. and Kim L., 2002. Global production networks, knowledge diffusion, and local  
 capability formation. Research Policy, 31 (8-9), 1417-1429. 
 
Friedman, T.L., 2010. Do believe the hype. The New York Times, Op-ed article, 2 
November. Available from:  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/opinion/03friedman.html 
 
Gao, T., 2003.  Ethnic Chinese networks and international investment: evidence from 
inward FDI in China. Journal of Asian Studies, 14 (4), 611-629. 
 
Gaulier, G., Lemoine, F., and Unal-Kesenci, D., 2009. China’s integration in East Asia: 
Production sharing, FDI & high-tech trade. CEPII, Working Paper No. 2005-09, June.  
Available from: http://www.cepii.fr.  
 
Gereffi, G. and Guler, E., 2010. Global production networks and decent work in India and 
China. In: A. Posthuma and D. Nathan, eds. Labour in Global Production Networks in 
India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 103-126.   
 
Ghani, E., Grover, A. and Kharas, H., 2011, Service with a smile: a new growth engine for 
poor countries, VOX, May 4; www.voxEU.org. 
 
Gregory, N., Nollen, S., and Tenev, S., 2009. New industries from new places: The 
emergence of the software and hardware industries in China and India. Washington, 
D.C. | Stanford, Calif.: The World Bank and Stanford University Press. 
 
Guruswamy, Mohan and Singh, Zorawar Daulet, 2010, Chasing the Dragon: Will India 
Catch Up with China?  Delhi|Chennai|Chandigarh: Dorling Kindersley (India) Pvt. Ltd 
licensees of Pearson Education of South Asia. 
  
Hanson, G.H., Mataloni, R.J. Jr., and Slaughter, M.J., 2005. Vertical production networks 
in multinational firms. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 87 (4), 664-678. 
 
Henley, J. S., 2004. Chasing the dragon: Accounting for the under-performance of India 
by comparison with China in attracting foreign direct investment. Journal of 
International Development, 16 (7), 1039-1052. 
 
Huang, Y., 2008. Capitalism with Chinese characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the state. 




International Labour Office (ILO). 2008:  Global Wage Report 2008/09: Minimum wages 




Kaur, I.N., 2009. Are the geese still flying? Catch-up industrialization in a changing 
international economic environment. Pacific Rim Report, 51 (January). 
 
Khan, S.M. and Khan, Z.S., 2003. Asian economic integration: A perspective on South 
Asia. Journal of Asian Economics, 13 (6), 767-785.  
 
Khanna, T., 2007. Billions of entrepreneurs: How China and India are reshaping their 
futures—and yours. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Kochhar, K., Kumar, U., Rajan, R., Subramanian, A., and Tokatlidis, I., 2006. India’s 
pattern of development: What happened, what follows? IMF Working Paper, 
International Monetary Fund 
 
Kose, M., Ayhan, O., Christopher, M. and Prasad, E.S., 2007. Global business cycles: 
Convergence or decoupling? Available from SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1136247 or doi:10.1111/j.0042-7092.2007.00700.x. 
 
Krugman, P., 1991, Increasing returns and economic geography,  Journal of Political 
Economy, 99, 483–499. 
 
Kumar, R and V. Worm, 2004, Institutional Dynamics and The Negotiation Process: 
 Comparing India and China, International Journal Of Conflict Management, Vol. 
15, No. 3, 304-334. http://www.opus-seminars.com/zarticles/RK-China-India-
Negotiation.pdf. 
 
Lall, M.C., 2001. India’s missed opportunity: India’s relationship with the non resident 
Indians. London: Ashgate.  
 
Lemoine, F. and Unal-Kesenci, D., 2004. Assembly trade and technology transfer: The 
case of China. World Development, 32 (5), 829-850. 
 
Li, F. and Li J., 2009, Comparative Research of FDI policy between China and India, 
 Journal of Shijiazhuang University of Economics, 
 http://en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTOTAL-HBDX200904015.htm. 
 
Lo, C.P. and Liu, B.J., 2009. Why India is mainly engaged in offshore service activities, 
while China is disproportionately engaged in manufacturing? China Economic Review, 
20 (2), 236-245.  
 
Luo, Y., 2001. Determinants of entry in an emerging economy: A multilevel approach. 




Mattoo, A., Olarreaga, M., and Saggi, K., 2001. Mode of foreign entry, technology transfer, 
and FDI policy. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2870. Available from: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=276776. 
 
Meredith, R., 2007. The elephant and the dragon: The rise of India and China and what it 
means for all of us. London: Norton publishers.  
 
Muller, T., 2006. Analyzing modes of foreign entry: Greenfield investment versus 
acquisition. Review of International Economics, 15 (1), 93-111. 
 
Naughton, B., ed., 1997. The China Circle: Economics and electronics in the PRC, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
  
Patel, U.R. and Bhattacharya, S., 2010. Infrastructure in India: The economics of transition 
from public to private provision. Journal of Comparative Economics, 38 (1), 52-70. 
 
Porter, M.E., 1994, The role of location in competition, Journal of  Economics and 
Business, 1(1), 35-39. 
 
Porter, M., 1998a. The competitive advantage of nations.  New York: Free Press. First 
published in 1990. 
 
Porter, M., 1998b. Clusters and the new economics of competition. Harvard Business 
Review, 76 (6), 77-90.  
 
Posthuma, A. and Nathan, D., 2010. Labour in global production networks in India.  New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
 
Prime, P.B., 2009. China and India enter global markets: Comparing economic 
development and future prospects. Economic Geography and Economics, 50 (4), 621-
642. 
 
Qi, L. and Prime, P.B., 2009. Market reforms and consumption puzzles in China. China 
Economic Review, 20 (3), 388-401.  
 
Rugman, A.M. and A. Verbeke, 2001, Subsidiary-specific advantages in 
 multinational enterprises, Strategic Management Journal, 22(3), 237-250. 
 
Saxenian, A.L., 2002. Transnational communities and the evolution of global production 
networks: The cases of Taiwan, China and India. Industry and Innovation, 9 (3), 183-
202. 
 
Sebastian, R. A. Parameswaran and F. Yahya, 2006, Doing Business in India, New 
 Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 8 (1), 17-40. 
 
Sinha, S.S., Kent, D. H. and Shomali, H., 2007, Comparative Analysis of FDI in China and 




Sohn, B. H., 2002. Regionalization of trade and investment in East Asia and prospects for 
further regional integration. Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 7 (2), 160-181. 
 
Strange R. and A. Majocchi, 2007, The FDI Location Decision: Does liberalization 
matter?, Transnational Corporations,  16 (2), 1-40,  
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20072a1_en.pdf 
 
Sung, Y-W., 2007. Made in China: From world sweatshop to a global manufacturing 
center. Asian Economic Papers, 6 (3), 43-72. 
 
Swamy, S., 2006. Financial architecture and economic development in China and India.  
India: Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd. 
 
Thakur, Ramesh, 2003. China is outperforming India, International Herald Tribune, 
January 7th. 
 
Thomson SDC International Mergers and Acquisitions Database 2010.  
 
Thursby, J. and Thursby, M., 2006. Here or there? A survey of factors in multinational 
R&D location. Report to the Government-University-Industry Research Roundtable, 
National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of 
Medicine.  Washington, D.C.: The National Academic Press. 
 
UNCTAD (various years), World Investment Reports. Available from: 
http://www.unctad.org.   
 
UNIDO. Available from: http://www.unido.org.  
 
U.S.-China Business Council, Available from:  
http://www.uschina.org/statistics/fdi_cumlative.html.  
 
Walker, M., 2006. India touts its democracy in bid to lure investors away from China.  The 
Wall Street Journal, 20 January, A2. 
 
Wei, W., 2005. China and India: Any difference in their FDI performances? Journal of 
Asian Economics, 16 (4), 719-736. 
 
Wei, W. and Dutta, M., 2004. Foreign direct investment in China: An analysis of source 
country and sector of utilization. Asian Economic Cooperation in the New 
Millennium: China's Economic Presence. 297-321. Available from: 
http://ebooks.worldscinet.com/ISBN/9789812565716/9789812565716_0015.html. 
  
Wiemer, C. and Cao, H., eds., 2004. Asian economic cooperation in the new millennium: 
China’s economic presence. River Edge, N.J.: World Scientific Publishing Co. 
 
World Databank, World Bank. Available from:  http://data.worldbank.org.  
 




World Economic Forum. 2009. Available from:   
 http://www.weforum.org/pdf/GCR09/GCR20092010fullrankings.pdf. 
 
World Economic Forum, Global Information Technology Report. Available from: 
http://networkedreadiness.com. 
 
Wu, L.X. and Yue, T.S., 2006. Supply clusters: A key to China's cost advantage. Supply 
Chain Management Review, 10 (2), 46-51. 
 
Yardley, J., 2011, Where growth and dysfunction have no boundaries, The New York 
Times, June 9, pp.A1, A12. 
 
Yusuf, S., Nabeshima, K., and Yamashita, S., eds., 2008. Growing industrial clusters in 




Table 1: Inward FDI flows: China and India 1970-2008 (US $ millions) 




Asia World FDI 














India as % of 
World FDI 
1970 0 45 854 13,346 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.3 
1971 0 48 796 14,282 0.0 0.0 6.0 0.3 
1972 0 18 1,423 14,933 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.1 
1973 0 38 1,648 20,646 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.2 
1974 0 57 -1,665 24,127 0.0 0.0 -3.4 0.2 
1975 0 85 5,265 26,567 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.3 
1976 0 51 1,605 22,002 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.2 
1977 0 -36 3,031 27,139 0.0 0.0 -1.2 -0.1 
1978 0 18 3,919 34,358 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 
1979 0 49 2,146 42,292 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.1 
1980 57 79 543 54,076 10.5 0.1 14.6 0.1 
1981 265 92 13,329 69,567 2.0 0.4 0.7 0.1 
1982 430 72 17,136 58,059 2.5 0.7 0.4 0.1 
1983 916 6 10,894 50,268 8.4 1.8 0.1 0.0 
1984 1,419 19 11,557 56,839 12.3 2.5 0.2 0.0 
1985 1,956 106 5,419 55,887 36.1 3.5 2.0 0.2 
1986 2,244 118 9,299 86,345 24.1 2.6 1.3 0.1 
1987 2,314 212 13,426 136,548 17.2 1.7 1.6 0.2 
1988 3,194 91 18,058 162,834 17.7 2.0 0.5 0.1 
1989 3,393 252 16,992 196,617 20.0 1.7 1.5 0.1 
1990 3,487 237 22,660 207,273 15.4 1.7 1.0 0.1 
1991 4,366 75 24,164 155,686 18.1 2.8 0.3 0.0 
1992 11,008 252 32,956 166,594 33.4 6.6 0.8 0.2 
1993 27,515 532 56,022 222,408 49.1 12.4 0.9 0.2 
1994 33,767 974 68,289 256,785 49.4 13.1 1.4 0.4 
1995 37,521 2,151 80,114 341,144 46.8 11.0 2.7 0.6 
1996 41,726 2,525 94,186 390,443 44.3 10.7 2.7 0.6 
1997 45,257 3,619 105,814 485,808 42.8 9.3 3.4 0.7 
1998 45,463 2,633 95,302 705,330 47.7 6.4 2.8 0.4 
1999 40,319 2,168 111,537 1,078,606 36.1 3.7 1.9 0.2 
2000 40,715 3,585 148,561 1,381,675 27.4 2.9 2.4 0.3 
2001 46,878 5,472 113,936 820,430 41.1 5.7 4.8 0.7 
2002 52,743 5,627 101,185 629,675 52.1 8.4 5.6 0.9 
2003 53,505 4,323 116,928 565,160 45.8 9.5 3.7 0.8 
2004 60,630 5,771 172,910 734,892 35.1 8.3 3.3 0.8 
2005 72,406 7,606 213,751 973,329 33.9 7.4 3.6 0.8 
2006 72,715 20,336 282,127 1,461,074 25.8 5.0 7.2 1.4 
2007 83,521 25,127 331,425 1,978,838 25.2 4.2 7.6 1.3 
2008 108,312 41,554 387,828 1,697,353 27.9 6.4 10.7 2.4 
2009 95,000 34613 301367 1114189 31.5 8.5 11.5 3.1 
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Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2009 
Table 2: FDI performance Index 
 
Year Inward FDI Performance Index Inward FDI Potential Index 
China India China India 
  scores scores scores scores 
1988-1990 1.033 0.066 0.176 0.120 
1990-1992 2.162 0.088 0.196 0.138 
1992-1994 2.162 0.088 0.190 0.152 
1994-1996 4.667 0.467 0.225 0.165 
1996-1998 2.761 0.417 0.251 0.167 
1998-2000 1.198 0.155 0.255 0.156 
2000-2002 1.331 0.215 0.273 0.159 
2002-2004 2.134 0.410 0.289 0.166 
2004-2006 1.320 0.615 0.304 0.163 
2005-2007 0.986 0.629 0.304 0.163 

































































Source: UNCTAD, 2008, Internet World Stats, 2008, Global Information Forum, 2009 
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Table 4: Transportation infrastructure 
  Airports 
Airports with 
paved 
runways Heliports Railways Roadways Ports and terminals1  
China 
(2008) 477 413 35 75,438 km 
1,930,544 km 
(2005) 
16 major and about 130 
open to foreign ships 
China 




(2008) 345 251 30 63,221 km 
3,316,452 km 
(2006) 
12 major and 187 minor 
and intermediate 
India 
(2010) 352 249 40 64,015 km 
3,3320,410 km 
(2009)  
Source: CIA World Fact book, 2008, 2010;  




Table 5:  Firm Entry constraints 
Country 
% of Firms Identifying 
Business Licensing 
and Permits as Major 
Constraint*** 
% of Firms Expected 
to Pay Informal 
Payment to Public 
Officials (to Get 
Things Done) 
% of Firms Expected 
to Give Gifts to Get an 
Operating License 
% of Firms Expected 
to Give Gifts to Get an 
Import License 
% of Firms Expected 
to Give Gifts to Get an 
Electrical Connection 
% of Firms Expected 
to Give Gifts to Get a 
Phone Connection 
All countries 
15.4 27.1 16.2 15.7 16.9 11.7 
East Asia & 
Pacific 10.3 31.1 20.7 20.6 21.6 11.6 
OECD 
9.7 12.6 .. .. .. .. 
South Asia 
11.9 34.7 20.7 20.5 31.9 22.7 
China 
21.33 72.57 8.49 10.9 5.61 5.51 
India 
9.92 47.49 52.45 45.99 39.63 20 
       
Country 
Incidence of Graft 
index 
% of Firms Expected 
to Give Gifts In 
Meetings With Tax 
Officials 
% of Firms Expected 
to Give Gifts to Secure 
a Government 
Contract** 
Value of Gift Expected 
to Secure Government 
Contract (% of 
Contract) 
% of Firms Identifying 
Corruption as a Major 
Constraint*** 
% of Firms expressing 
that a Typical Firm 
Reports less than 
100% of Sales for Tax 
Purposes 
All countries 
14.8 16.7 28.5 2.3 36.1 53 
East Asia & 
Pacific 20.8 22 34.6 4.1 26.6 63.8 
OECD 
.. 28.3 15.6 0.4 8.1 36.2 
South Asia 
23.2 30.6 31.4 1.5 33.8 36.3 
China 
8.38 38.74 27.04 1.25 27.33 49.45 
India 
36.57 52.32 23.79 0.96 25.65 59.24 
Source: World Bank enterprise surveys 
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Table 6: Export and Import statistics 
  China India 
Exports $1.485 trillion f.o.b. (2008) $187.3 billion f.o.b. (2008) 
Exports of 
Commodities 
Electrical and other machinery, 
including data processing 
equipment, apparel, textiles, iron 
and steel, optical and medical 
equipment 
Petroleum products, textile 




Export partners 1990 
Hong Kong (43.3%); Japan 
(14.7%); U.S. (8.5%); Germany 
(3.3%); Singapore (3.2%); Korea 
(0.7%) 
U.S. (15.1%); Japan (9.3%); 
Germany (7.6%); U.K. 
(6.2%); Hong Kong (3.1%); 
Italy (2.8%); UAE (2.6%); 
PRC (0.1%) 
Export partners 2008 
U.S. (18.4%); Hong Kong 
(13.6%); Japan (8.1%); Korea 
(5.1%); Germany (4.1%) 
U.S. (13.1%); PRC (11.1%); 
UAE (8.9%); Singapore 
(4.3%); Hong Kong (3.7%); 
U.K. (3.7%) 
   
Imports $1.191 trillion f.o.b. (2008) $299.4 billion f.o.b. (2008) 
Imports of 
Commodities 
Electrical and other machinery, oil 
and mineral fuels, optical and 
medical equipment, metal ores, 
plastics, organic chemicals 
Crude oil, machinery, gems, 
fertilizer, chemicals 
Imports Partners 1990 
Japan (14.2%); U.S. (12.2%); 
Germany (5.5%); Australia 
(2.5%); Singapore (1.6%); 
Malaysia (1.6%) 
U.S. (11.0%); Germany 
(7.7%); Japan (7.5%); U.K. 
(6.9%); UAE (4.0%); 
Australia (3.2%); Singapore 
(2.9%) 
Import Partners 2008 
Japan (12.5%); Korea (10.2%); 
U.S.(6.8%); Germany (4.6%); 
Australia (3.1%); Malaysia (2.9%) 
PRC (11.9%); U.S. (6.9%); 
Singapore (4.5%); Germany 
(4.4%); Australia (4.0%); 
Japan (2.9%); UAE (2.9%); 
Korea (2.8%) 
Source: CIA World Fact book for major traded commodities and Asia Development Bank, 




Table 7: Value of Cross Border Mergers and Acquisition Transactions ($ millions) 























Australia  63 468 531 Australia  416 2,990 3,405 
Bahrain  2 379 381 Belgium  2 1,158 1,159 
Belgium  1 188 189 Canada  266 1,551 1,817 
Canada  104 95 199 France  4 3,076 3,079 
China  25 8 32 Germany  23 3,091 3,114 
Denmark  11 102 113 Hong Kong 2 24,008 101,274 125,284 
Finland  13 110 123 Japan 10 583 5,283 5,877 
France  184 2,762 2,946 Luxembourg  - 1,842 1,842 
Germany  362 1,694 2,056 Malaysia  610 1,355 1,965 
Hong Kong  364 1,340 1,705 Netherlands  34 1,337 1,372 
Italy  246 524 770 Other 10 1,512 7,901 9,423 
Japan  130 9,147 9,277 Singapore  1,598 16,188 17,786 
Malaysia  34 5,150 5,185 South Korea  9 3,631 3,640 
Mauritius  146 7,187 7,334 Spain  5 2,338 2,343 
Netherlands  35 1,211 1,246 Switzerland  183 973 1,156 
Singapore  248 6,041 6,289 Taiwan  58 1,779 1,836 
South Africa  2 8,843 8,845 
United 
Kingdom 50 617 10,177 10,844 
South Korea  91 62 153 United States  3,046 43,809 46,855 
Supranational 34 353 213 600 Total 73 32,973 209,752 242,797 
Sweden  69 492 562 China 1 10,172 352,515 362,689 
Switzerland  59 1,215 1,273 Grand Total 74 43,145 562,267 605,486 
Taiwan   44 44           
Thailand  17 46 62        
United 
Kingdom 51 440 25,112 25,603        
United States  1,854 19,282 21,136        
Unknown  111 345 456        
Other  77 6,960 7,036        
TOTAL   84 5,039 99,022 104,145        
India 216 9,734 104,600 114,550        
Grand Total 300 14,773 203,622 218,695           






1 See Prime (2009) for a review of the literature comparing China and India in terms of economic performance.   
 
2 Along similar lines, G.P. Hinduja, President of the Hinduja Group when asked about the lack of investment by expats 
in India, stated unequivocally that the general lack of interest in manufacturing units in India by Non Resident Indians 
(NRIs) is because of bureaucratic hurdles and the lack of transparency and accountability at all levels. In addition, he 
noted that the NRIs are not provided the same infrastructure and network that local industrialists enjoy 
(http://archives.digitaltoday.in/businesstoday/netexcl/netex2106/hinduja.htm). 
 
3  The eight variables that are included are: rate of GDP growth, per capita GDP, share of exports in GDP, telephone 
lines per 1,000 inhabitants, commercial energy use per capita, share of R&D expenditures in gross national income, 
share of tertiary students in the population and political and commercial country risk.  
 
4 In order to compare these indices more systematically, a simple t-test of difference in means and a Wilcoxin test of 
medians of the rankings and scores of the indices was done on the data in table 2.  These results confirm that China has 
had statistically significant differences in inward FDI performance and potential compared to India.   
 
5 At least one estimate published in 2007 had India’s wages a bit higher at $1.60 per hour compared with $1.50 in 
China (KPMG report cited in note 4, Gereffi & Guler 2010). 
 
6 A recent paper by Thursby and Thursby (2006) presents results from over 200 multinational companies across 15 
industries regarding the factors that influence decisions on where to conduct research and Development (R&D). They 
note that for companies locating in emerging economies, the most important attraction was the growth potential in the 
market followed by the quality of R&D personnel. Poor quality of intellectual property protection was a detractor.   
 
7 Source: UNCTAD, based on information from OCO Consulting, LOCO monitor website (www.locomonitor.com).  
Note that these investments include new (Greenfield) and expansion FDI projects, both announced and realized. 
 
8 Horizontal clusters are characterized by units which process the raw material to produce and subsequently market the 
finished product themselves. Vertical clusters are where the operations required in producing the finished product are 
carried out separately by different units, most of which are SMEs. 
 
9 For examples of such clusters in India, see UNIDO at  http://www.unido.org/index.php?id=o4308 
 
10 In a search of journal articles in the EconLit database since 1989 for the words “production networks” in the abstract, 
out of the 218 items found only three had any reference to India.  Most focused on China, Taiwan and East Asia 
generally, while a few dealt with Eastern Europe, the EU and the U.S.  A recent book deals with labor and production 
networks in India, but the focus is on the effect of global production networks on wages and working conditions within 
connected firms in India (Posthuma and Nathan 2010). 
 
11 While Lo and Liu (2009) argue that without overseas Chinese investments, China’s FDI-GDP ratio is almost the 
same as that of India on average in the 1990s (Lo and Liu, 2007, page 244), there are two things to note. One is that a 
majority of these overseas Chinese were from Hong Kong and Taiwan and second, the data reported by Lo and Liu is 
post 1991. Our argument here is that that the initial flows of FDI that China received in the 1980s due to ‘location and 
timing’ (chance) resulted in a snowball effect leading to more FDI in the 1990s, regardless of the source of the FDI.  
 
12 It should also be noted that the establishment of the special economic zones was a very controversial policy within 
the Chinese central government at the time, and objections continued until at least 1992 when Deng Xiaoping visited 
them for the first time and gave his public approval to the zones and the strategy behind them.   
                                                 
